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"JUNK SCIENCE": 
THE CRIMINAL CASES 
PAUL C. GIANNELLI* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Vol. 84, No. I 
Printed in U.S.A. 
Currently, the role of expert witnesses in civil trials is under 
vigorous attack. "Expert testimony is becoming an embarrassment 
to the law of evidence," notes one commentator. 1 Articles like those 
entitled "Experts up to here"2 and "The Case Against Expert Wit-
nesses"3 appear in Forbes and Fortune. Terms such as "junk science," 
"litigation medicine," "fringe science," and "frontier science" are 
in vogue.4 Physicians complain that "[l]egal cases can now be de-
cided on the type of evidence that the scientific community rejected 
decades ago."5 
A. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The expert testimony provisions of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are the focal point of criticism. Adopted in 1975, the Federal 
Rules "revolutionized"6 the role of experts by "sweep[ing] away the 
restrictive dogma that curtailed expert proof. " 7 By 1986, however, 
a backlash against the expanded role of experts had developed. 
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote 
that it "is time to take hold of expert testimony in federal trials. " 8 
* Albert]. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
I James W. McElhaney, The 1992 All-Angus Rules, 19 LITIG. 19, 21 (Fall 1992). 
2 Deirdre Fanning, Experts up to here, FoRBEs, July 13, 1987, at 378. 
3 Walter Olson, The Case Against Expert Witnesses, FoRTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989, at 133. 
4 Clifford]. Zatz, Defenses on the Frontiers of Science, 19 LITIG. 13 (Fall 1992). 
5 James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Teratogens and "Litogens ", 315 NEw ENG.]. MED. 
1234, 1235 (1986). 
6 Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: lnsun·ng 
Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43 ("Ten years after the revolu-
tion in expert witness testimony, the legal community has not yet fully appreciated the 
true impact of the new approach and attitude of the Federal Rules of Evidence on trial 
practice."). 
7 Margaret B. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach to an Expert's 
Opinion About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not Jl'ork, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 559, 559 (1989). 
8 In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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There are two aspects to his criticism. First, "experts whose opin-
ions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a 
court of law."9 Second, courts should reject "opinions of experts 
not based upon a generally accepted scientific principle." 10 
The general acceptance standard for the admissibility of novel 
scientific evidence is derived from Frye v. United States, 11 a 1923 deci-
sion prohibiting the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The Frye 
test requires that scientific evidence be generally accepted in the sci-
entific community as a prerequisite to admissibility; it is more re-
strictive than Federal Rule 702, 12 a deceptively simple provision. 
Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 13 
9 !d. For an insightful discussion of the "hired gun" problem, see Samuel R. Gross, 
Expert Evidence, 1991 Wts. L REv. 1113 (proposing several changes to ensure the ap-
pointment of neutral experts). 
10 Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(Higginbotham,]., dissenting from denial of en bane review). Judge Higginbotham also 
wrote that the "role of experts" is "one of the more vexing problems currently facing 
the federal courts." !d. See also Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644 
(7th Cir. 1986) (commenting that "[t]here is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its 
face, that cannot now be proved by some so-called 'experts.'") (citation omitted). 
II 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
12 The Frye standard places a special burden on the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence. It is not enough that a qualified expert testify to the validity of a novel tech-
nique; general acceptance in the scientific community is required. This conservative 
standard is thought to be more demanding than an opposing approach, which treats 
scientific evidence no differently than other types of evidence-balancing its probative 
value against the risks of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury. See I PAUL C. GIAN-
NELLI & EDWARD j. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. l (2d ed. 1993) (discussing 
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, including the Frye test). 
13 FED. R. Evm. 702. Some commentators believe that there is no need for change. 
See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be 
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991). 
FED. R. Evm. 703, which governs the bases of expert testimony, is also a frequent 
target of criticism. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 176 (2d ed. 1991) ("Rule 703 was a controversial rule 
when enacted, and it remains controversial."). Rule 703 provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be ad-
missible in evidence. 
See also Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L 
REv. 45 (1993) (discussing confrontation issues that arise under Rule 703 in criminal 
cases); Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the &pert 
Witnesss Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CoRNELL L REv. 350 
( 1992) (discussing the confusion between Rules 702 and 703). 
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Instead of Frye's demand for general scientific acceptance, mere 
"assistance" to the jury is the touchstone of admissibility under Rule 
702. 14 
Peter Huber, a prominent critic of the federal rules of evidence, 
coined the phrase "junk science" to describe judicial acceptance of 
unreliable expert testimony. His book, Galileo s Revenge: junk Science 
in the Courtroom, sparked a heated debate about the nature and ex-
tent of the abuse of science in litigation. 15 Huber's most sensational 
example of junk science involved a "soothsayer" who "with the 
backing of expert testimony from a doctor and several police de-
14 On June 28, 1993, while this article was in press, the Court decided Daubert v. 
Me?Tell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993}, a case involving the admissibility 
of expert testimony in a civil trial. The Court ruled that the Frye test had not survived 
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court, however, also held that sci-
entific evidence must satisfy a reliability text. 
Under the Daubert analysis, the trial court must make "a preliminary assessment of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid 
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in 
issue." In performing this "gatekeeping function," the trial court may consider a 
number of factors. First, the court should determine whether the scientific theory or 
technique can be and has been tested. Citing scientific authorities, the Court recognized 
that a hallmark of science is empirical testing. Second, a relevant, though not disposi-
tive, consideration in assessing scientific validity is whether a theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication. The peer review and publication process 
increases the likelihood that flaws in methodology will be detected. Third, a technique's 
known or potential rate of error is also a relevant factor. Fourth, the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation is another indicium of 
trustworthiness. Finally, "general acceptance" remains an important consideration. 
Although the Court rejected "general acceptance" as the sole criterion for admissibility, 
it recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence. These fac-
tors, however, are neither dispositive nor exhaustive. Indeed, the Court emphasized 
that the Rule 702 standard is "a flexible one." 
A news report on Daubert described the case as "invit[ing] judges to be aggressive in 
screening out ill-founded or speculative scientific theories." Linda Greenhouse, justices 
Put judges in Charge of Deciding Reliability of Scientific Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, 
at AIO. Nevertheless, whether the lower courts interpret Daubert in that fashion remains 
to be seen. 
15 PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: jUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991) 
[hereinafter GALILEo's REVENGE]. See also Peter W. Huber, Medical ExpMs and the Ghost of 
Galileo, 54 LAw & .CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 119; Peter W. Huber.junk Science 
in the Courtroom, FoRBEs, july 8, 1991, at 68. 
For reviews of Huber's book, see Arthur Austin, Book Review, 29 Hous. L. REv. 481 
( 1992); Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic To1·t Law, and Expert Evidence: .-1 Reaction to Peter 
Huber, 44 ARK. L. REv. 629 (199l);jeffL. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? junk Science in the 
Work of Peter Huber, 21 HoFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1992); Anthony Z. Roisman, Galileo's Re-
venge: junk Science in the Courtroom, TRIAL, Jan. 1992, at 76 ("Because Galileo 's Revenge is 
written in an effective, entertaining style, it is particularly dangerous."); Book Note, Re-
bel ll'itlzout A Cause, 105 HARV. L. REv. 935 (1992) (reviewing GALILEo's REVENGE: JUNK 
SciENCE IN THE CouRTROOM) ("[I]t is imperative to disentangle Huber's two criticisms: 
one evidentiary, against junk science; the other policy-oriented, against modem substan-
tive ton law."). 
108 PAUL C. GIANNELLI [Vol. 84 
partment officials" won a million dollar jury award due to the loss of 
her "psychic powers following a CAT scan." 16 Huber advocates the 
Frye test as the way to curtail the use ofjunk science. 17 
These attacks on scientific evidence have not gone unheeded. 
Judges now feel compelled to justify their decisions to admit expert 
testimony by claiming that the evidence "is not junk science' " and 
that the expert "is no quack." 18 Furthermore, some courts are rais-
ing obstacles to the admissibility of scientific evidence. By 1991, the 
Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, was prepared to apply the restrictive 
Frye test to civil cases, a significant departure from prior practice. 19 
In response to such developments, momentum for reform be-
gan with the Civil Rules Committee, which proposed an amendment 
to Federal Rule 702 ·in 1991. The proposal requires expert testi-
mony to "substantially" assist, rather than merely "assist," the trier 
of fact, and then only if the testimony is based on "reasonably relia-
ble" information. 20 The last provision apparently embodies a modi-
fied Frye rule. 21 The Committee also proposed more expansive 
discovery of expert testimony in civil cases, including disclosure of a 
detailed written report "previewing" the expert's testimony. 22 This 
16 GALILEo's REVENGE, supra note 15, at 3-4. Vice President Quayle cites this exam-
ple without including the next sentence. Huber's next sentence is: "The trial judge 
threw out that verdict." !d. at 4. Instead, the Vice President writes that such stories "are 
becoming almost commonplace." Dan Quayle, Civil justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 
559, 566 ( 1992). 
17 GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 15, at 14, 199. 
18 Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990)(Easterbrook, J., 
concurring). 
One commentator, however, uses Carroll to illustrate unnecessary expert testimony. 
The plaintiff was injured when an unidentified child pushed the emergency stop button 
on an escalator. "An 'elevator button expert'-a clinical psychologist -testified that 'red 
buttons attract small children, this button was unreasonably easy for a child to push, and 
that a covered stop button is less accessible to children than an uncovered stop but-
ton.' " McElhaney, supra note 1, at 21. 
19 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 ( 1992). In an earlier case, a panel of the Fifth 
Circuit applied the Frye test in a civil case. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984). For a further discussion of this point, see infra text 
accompanying notes 35-36. 
See generally Recent Case, Evidence-Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-Fifth Circuit Lim-
its Permissible Scientific Evidence to Generally Accepted Theories-Christophersen v. Allied-Sig-
nal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (per curiam), 105 HARV. L. REv. 791 
(1992). 
20 Preliminary Dmft of Proposed Amendments to the Fedeml Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 156 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. 
21 The accompanying Advisory Committee note states that this standard "does not 
mandate a return to the strictures of Frye v. United States .. .. However, the court is called 
upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any significant support and 
acceptance within the scientific community." !d. at 157 (Advisory Committee's note). 
22 Proposed amendment, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) (disclosure of expert testimony). 
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tied directly to Rule 702; failure to comply 
rule renders the expert's testimony 
The impetus for reform, however, was not limited to the judi-
cial arena. The President's Council on Competitiveness, chaired by 
former Vice President Dan Quayle, established a Civil Justice Re-
form Task Force.24 Once again, expert testimony was targeted. 
Quayle declared that "it is time to reject the notion that 'junk sci-
ence' is truly relevant evidence."25 The Task Force offered its own 
amendment to Federal Rule 702. It tracked the proposal of the Civil 
Rules Committee, requiring expert testimony to provide "substan-
tial" assistance to the trier of fact; the Task Force then added two 
new provisions. First, expert testimony must be "based on a widely 
accepted explanatory theory." Second, an expert receiving a con-
tingent fee may not testify.26 Not waiting for the amendment pro-
cess, former President Bush imposed these requirements on 
Jd. at 89. The parties must "provide other litigants with a written report from its expert. 
The report must be detailed and complete-in essence, a preview of the direct testimony 
from such person, including any exhibits to be used to summarize or support the per-
son's opinions. After the report has been provided, the expert may be deposed .... " Jd. 
at 67 (Letter to Chair, Standing Committee, from Chair, Civil Rules Committee, June 
13, 1991). 
23 The proposed Rule provides: 
[If] Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized [knowledge] in-
fomzation, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if( I) the information is 
reasonablv reliable and will substantial!~ assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, and (2) the [a] witness is qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide such testimony, [may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise]. Except with leave of cow·t for 
good cawe shown, the witness shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to any 
opinion or inference, or 1·eason or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as required 
by Rules 26( a)( 2) and 26( e)( I) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Jd. at 156 (deleted material in brackets; new material in italics). 
2 4 Solicitor General Kenneth Starr chaired the Task Force. The Task Force report, 
Agenda for Civil jwtice Reform in America, is reprinted in 60 U. CtN. L. REv. 977 (1992). 
The Task Force prepared a number of documents: (I) proposed amendments to 
the Federal Rules, (2) the Access to Justice Act of 1992, which was transmitted to Con-
gress, and (3) the Civil Justice Reform Model State Amendments. I d. 
25 Junk Science or junk Law?, 3 THE EXPERT WITNESS J. (Aug./Sept. 1991 ). 
26 The proposed amendment to Rule 702 provides: 
(a) Qualification of Expert Testimony. If the court finds ( 1) that scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will substantial()' assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(2) that a proffered witness is qualified as an expert in the field for which the expert 
is called to testify by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; and 
( 3) that the proffered witness' testimony is based on a widely accepted explanatory theOI)'; 
then the witness may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Prohibition on Contingent Fee for Expert Witness. A witness shall be qualified under 
Rule 702( a)( 2) only if the court finds that an)' compensation to the witness direct{)' or indirect()' 
will not vary as a result of any outcome of the case. 
Agenda For Civil justice Refoml in American, supm note 24, at 1049 (new material in italics). 
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government attorneys in civil cases by executive order.27 Under this 
order, a theory is considered "widely accepted" if it is propounded 
by at least a substantial minority of experts in the relevant field. 28 
With this backdrop, the U.S. Supreme Court took certiorari in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 29 to determine whether the 
Frye test survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Daubert involved the admissibility of expert testimony concerning 
whether Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug, causes birth defects. 
B. THE CRIMINAL CASES 
Despite the highly visible efforts to reform the rules governing 
experts in the civil arena, the "junk science" debate has all but ig-
nored criminal prosecutions. With one exception, Huber's book fo-
cuses on only civillitigation.30 Similarly, the proposed amendment 
to Rule 702 was promulgated by the Civil Rules Committee in order 
to combat perceived abuses in civil trials. The Committee wrote: 
"Particularly in civil litigation with high financial stakes, large expendi-
tures for marginally useful expert testimony has become common-
place. Procurement of expert testimony is occasionally used as a 
trial technique to wear down adversaries. " 31 The second sentence 
of the proposed rule applies only to civil cases: if a party fails to 
comply with the civil discovery rules, its expert is disqualified. 32 
The Quayle proposals are also limited to civil litigation. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court chose a civil case to decide the Frye issue. 33 
This neglect of the problems of expert testimony in criminal 
27 Civiljustice Reform, Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991). 
28 !d. OnJan. 30, 1993, the Department of Justice issued preliminary guidelines on 
the implementation of this Executive Order. Department of Justice, Memorandum of 
Preliminary Guidance on Implementation of the Litigation Reforms of Executive Order 
No. 12,778, 57 FED. REG. 3640 (1992). 
29 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992). For a discussion of Daubert, see supra note 14. 
The Court had declined to grant certiorari to decide the issue on two prior occa-
sions, one of which occurred only a year before. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 
112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). In Christophersen, Justice White, along with Justice Blackmun, 
dissented from the denial of certiorari, commenting that "[i]t is an issue that has long 
divided the federal courts." !d. at 1281. See also Mustafa v. United States, 4 79 U.S. 953 
(1986). 
30 The criminal case cited by Huber is Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
GALILEO 's REVENGE, supra note 15, at 217-18. For a discussion of Barefoot, see infra text 
accompanying notes 49-72. 
31 Preliminary Draft, supra note 20, at 156 (emphasis added). 
32 See supra note 23. The result is perhaps explainable, if not justifiable, due to the 
committee structure. At the time the amendment was proposed, there were two com-
mittees, a Civil Rules Committee and a Criminal Rules Committee. The proposed 
amendments originated with the Civil Rules Committee. An Evidence Rules Committee 
has recently been appointed. 
33 The Court declined to decide the issue in United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 
1993 EXPERT TESTIMONY Ill 
prosecutions is deplorable, if not inexplicable.34 The Frye test, 
which has generated so much controversy, arose from a criminal 
case, and historically had been applied in only criminal cases.35 Not 
until 1984 was the Frye test applied in a federal civil case.36 The 
criticism of Frye in criminal cases had surfaced earlier.37 Indeed, the 
National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists sponsored a confer-
ence on the Frye test in the early 1980s.38 Building on this confer-
ence, the ABA Section of Science and Technology organized a 
symposium on the topic, focusing on proposed amendments to Rule 
702.39 Further, the ABA Criminal Justice Section issued a report 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, II3 S. Ct. 104 (1992), a criminal case in which DNA evidence was 
admitted. 
34 One explanation is politics. "The I992 Republican platform included a promise 
to throw out junk science' from American courtrooms." Lewin, supra note I5, at I85. 
"Mr. Quayle's cause of reducing costs in civil litigation is taking on the aura of a cam-
paign issue for next year." Randall Sam born, VP Volleys Once More With the ABA, NAT'L 
LJ., Nov. II, 1991, at I, 28. 
35 See FAUST F. Rossi, EXPERT WITNESSES 36 (199I) ("The Frye standard traditionally 
has been applied almost exclusively in criminal cases."); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.02, at 651 (3d ed. 1991) ("The Frye test has been 
applied most frequently over the years in criminal cases .... "); I DAVID W. LOVISELL & 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 853 (1977) ("The Frye standard ... is 
rarely applied in civil litigation; Frye itself has been cited only in a very few civil cases, 
principally in state courts in connection with blood tests to determine paternity."). 
In advocating the general acceptance standard in his book, however, Peter Huber 
fails to acknowledge the fact that Frye had been applied almost exclusively to criminal 
cases. 
36 Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d I 028 (5th Cir. 1984), 
appears to be the first case. The court excluded evidence based on voice stress analysis, 
a decision that followed earlier criminal cases. See I GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra 
note I2, § 8-6 (discussing scientific and legal status of voice stress analysis). 
37 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, aHalf-Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. ll97, I207-08 (1980) ("[T]he problems 
Frye has engendered-the difficulties in applying the test and the anomolous results it 
creates-so far outweigh [its] advantages that the argument for adopting a different test 
has become overwhelming."); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Ap-
proach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879, 915 (1982) (Frye's "main drawbacks are its 
inflexibility, confusion of issues, and superfluity."); John Strong, Questions Affecting the 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. I, I4 ("The Frye standard, however, 
tends to obscure these proper considerations by asserting an undefinable general ac-
ceptance as the principal if not sole determinative factor."). 
38 Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. I87 (1983). The National 
Conference of Lawyers and Scientists is a joint organization of the ABA and the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science. 
39 See Fredric I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 26 
jURIMETRICS J. 240 (1986); Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific 
Evidence, 26juRIMETRicsj. 245 (1986);James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured 
and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249 
(1986); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 702, 26 
j URIMETRICS j. 260 (1986). 
Commentaries on the various proposals were later discussed at the ABA's annual 
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identifying the continued validity of Frye as an important unresolved 
issue.40 
Moreover, the junk science opponents' failure to deal with 
criminal prosecutions cannot be explained by differences in the use 
of expert testimony in civil and criminal cases.41 Scientific evidence 
has played a significantly greater role in criminal prosecutions in re-
cent years. DNA profiling is only the latest example.42 Sophisti-
cated instrumental techniques such as neutron activation analysis, 
atomic absorption, mass spectrometry, and scanning electron mi-
croscopy are common. 43 Other examples include electrophoretic 
blood testing, voice prints, bite mark comparison, hypnotically re-
freshed testimony, trace metal detection, voice stress analysis, and 
horizontal gaze nystagmus.44 In addition, the use of social science 
research, often in the form of "syndrome" evidence, has flooded the 
courts. For example, evidence of rape trauma syndrome, battered 
wife syndrome, and child abuse accommodation syndrome is now 
frequently admitted at trial. 45 
In addition, the failure to take account of scientific evidence in 
criminal litigation has led to some remarkable results. While former 
conference in August 1986. Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 
(1987). 
40 ABA CRIMINAL jUSTICE SECTION, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: A FRESH REVIEW 
AND EVALUATION 70 (Aug. 1987), reprinted in 120 F.R.D. 299, 368 (1988). 
41 Judge Becker and Professor Orenstein have commented: 
Some of the most important issues concerning expert testimony, such as the admis-
sibility of DNA typing, voiceprints, and polygraphs, arise in criminal cases. The 
Civil Rules Committee proposals may not focus sufficiently upon the specialized 
needs of the prosecution or of criminal defendants. We note that the Criminal 
Rules Committee disapproved the Civil Rules Committee's initial Rule 702 propo-
sal, but the Standing Committee nevertheless modified and submitted it for public 
comment. 
Edward R. Becker & A via Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The 
Effect of"Plain Meaning"jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Commillee on the Rules of Evi-
dence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 861-62 
(1992). 
42 For a discussion of DNA evidence, see articles in this symposium: William C. 
Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Forensic Tests: Lessons from the "DNA ll'ar ", 84 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993); Rockne Harmon, Legal Criticisms of DNA Typing: 
Wheres the Beef?, 84]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1993); Peter]. Neufeld, Have Fou Xo 
Seme of Decency?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1993); See also 2 GIANNELLI & IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 12 (DNA evidence). 
43 For a discussion of these techniques as well as the others cited in this essay, see 
GIANNELLI & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 12. 
44 See Stephanie Busloff, Comment, Can J'our Eyes Be Csed Against J'ou? The C'se of the 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test in the Courtroom, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 203 (1993). 
45 See I GIANNELLI & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, ch. 9 (discussing battered woman, 
rape trauma, and child sexual abuse accommodation syndromes); David L. Faigman, To 
Have and Have Not: Assessing the l'alue of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 
EMORY LJ. 1005 (1989). 
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President Bush's executive order required U.S. attorneys m civil 
cases to meet a heightened admissibility standard ("wide accept-
ance") when introducing scientific evidence,46 federal prosecutors 
were left free in the DNA cases to argue for a lower standard, 
"urg[ing] that Rule 702 creates a liberal rule of admissibility which 
now supersedes Frye."4 7 Similarly, while former Vice President 
Quayle was championing the need for liberal discovery in civil litiga-
tion, federal prosecutors were opposing discovery of the most ele-
mentary kind in DNA cases.4B 
This essay extends the junk science debate to criminal prosecu-
tions. It examines three issues raised by this debate: (1) the neces-
sity for use of a stringent standard when determining the 
admissibility of novel scientific evidence, (2) the need to secure the 
services of unbiased experts, and (3) the desirability of liberal pre-
trial discovery of expert testimony. 
II. NovEL SciENTIFIC EviDENCE 
The impact of "junk science" in criminal cases is poignantly il-
lustrated by Barefoot v. Estelle,49 the only criminal case that Huber 
discusses. Thomas Barefoot was convicted of capital murder in 
Texas. In the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution offered the 
testimony of two psychiatrists who testified about Barefoot's future 
dangerousness, a qualifying factor under the Texas death penalty 
statute. 5° One psychiatrist, Dr. James Grigson, without ever exam-
ining Barefoot, testified that there was a " 'one hundred percent and 
absolute' chance that B·arefoot would commit future acts of criminal 
violence." 51 Barefoot argued before the Supreme Court that, due 
to its unreliability, admission of this evidence violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. 
In an amicus brief, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
stated that the "unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term 
future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the pro-
46 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
47 United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990) (vacated after death of 
defendant), 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991) (en bane). See also United States v. Yee, 134 
F.R.D. 161, 188 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (prosecutors argued that Frye has been displaced). 
48 See infra text accompanying notes 122-24. 
49 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
50 TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(l) (West 1993) (requiring a jury 
finding that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"). See Jurek v. Texas, 428 
U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of the Texas statute). 
51 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun,J. dissenting) (quoting from record). 
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fession," and the "APA's best estimate is that two out of three predic-
tions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists are 
wrong."52 The APA position was supported by a substantial body of 
research53 and misstated by Dr. Grigson at trial. 54 Nevertheless, the 
Court ruled that such testimony was not constitutionally infirm. 
Writing for the Court, Justice White noted that "[n]either petitioner 
nor the [APA] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with re-
spect to future dangerousness, only most of the time."55 
Given the context, such a standard-"not always wrong"-
shocks the conscience. 56 One suspects that the Justices would not 
choose a neurosurgeon on such a basis, nor even a podiatrist. 
Thomas Barefoot was executed on October 24, 1984.57 As Huber 
notes, one could favor the death penalty and "yet still recoil at the 
thought that a junk science fringe of psychiatry ... could decide who 
will be sent to the gallows. " 58 
Some commentators believe that testimony concerning future 
dangerousness is so lacking in reliability that it is unethical. 59 In-
52 /d. at 920 (quoting brief). 
53 See Charles Patrick Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The Constitutionality of 
Punishing Future Crimes, 15 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 139 (1991); Michael L. Radelet &James 
W. Marquart, Assessing Nondangerousness During Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 54 ALBANY L. 
REv. 845 (1990); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97 
(1984). 
54 Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Grigson concerning studies that demon-
strated the inherent unreliability of predictions of future dangerousness. In response, 
Dr. Grigson testified that only a small minority of psychiatrists accepted these studies 
and these studies did not represent the view of the APA. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919. 
55 /d. at 90 I. At another point the Court wrote: "We are not persuaded that such 
testimony is almost entirely unreliable .... " !d. at 899. 
56 The term "shocks the conscience" was used by Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), in which the Court condemned the stomach-pump-
ing of a suspect to retrieve evidence. The term is even more apt here. In a scathing 
dissent in Barefoot, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me. One may 
accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at 
stake . . . a requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the 
specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by 
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death 
itself. 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916. See also George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangemusness, "Psychi-
atric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 AM.j. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977) (commenting on 
Dr. Grigson's "willingness to operate at the brink of quackerty"). 
57 United Press International, Placard-Wielding Crowds Cheer Twin Injections, Oct. 30, 
1984. 
58 Galileo's Revenge, supra note 15, at 220. 
59 "[There] is good reason to conclude that psychologists and psychiatrists act uneth-
ically when they render predictions of dangerousness that provide a legal basis for re-
stricting another person's interest in life or liberty." Ewing, supra note 53, at 162. See 
also Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future J'io-
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deed, the APA reprimanded Dr. Grigson for claiming 100% accu-
racy in capital cases in which he did not examine the defendant.60 
Nevertheless, Dr. Grigson continued to testify. By May 1990, juries 
had returned death penalties in 118 of the 127 cases in which he had 
testified. 61 It is essentially the same testimony in every case: 
He'll take the stand, listen to a recitation of facts about the killing and 
the killer, and then-usually without examining the defendant, without 
ever setting eyes on him until the day of the trial-tell the jury that, as 
a matter of medical science, he can assure them the defendant will pose a 
continuing danger to society as defined by [the Texas statute]. That's 
all it takes. 62 
Dr. Grigson apparently revels in selling his views to the jury and 
setting traps for defense counsel, 63 and when now questioned about 
the APA position on the unreliability of predictions of future dan-
gerousness, he replies: "The Supreme Court disagreed with 
them."64 
Dr. Grigson gained notoriety, ifnot fame, as "Dr. Death" in the 
documentary film, The Thin Blue Line, which concerned the capital 
trial of Randall Adams.65 Grigson's testimony about Adams' future 
dangerousness helped put Adams on death row.66 Even though Ad-
fence?, 16 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 621, 629 (1992) ("The ethics of predictions of future 
violence in such a context indeed are questionable."). 
60 Radelet & Marquart, supra note 53, at 851 n.31; RoN RosENBAUM, TRAVELS WITH 
DR. DEATH 218 (1991) (The APA "sent me a letter saying that this will serve as a repri-
mand.") (quoting Dr. Grigson). 
The chapter on Dr. Grigson in Rosenbaum's book was originally published as an 
article. Ron Rosenbaum, Travels With Dr. Death, VANITY FAIR, May 1990, at 141. 
61 RosENBAUM, supra note 60, at 206. 
62 !d. at 210. 
63 See id. at 211 ("And as a bonus for the prosecutors who hire him, the Doctor also 
does his lethal best to destroy defense attorneys and defense witnesses who challenge 
him."); id. at 211-12 ("[W]hat makes him popular with prosecutors is that he will go the 
extra mile; he will go for the jugular to score points to win."); id. at 220 ("The Doctor 
had told me of the particular relish he has for doing damage on cross-examination. 'I 
always hold something back for cross,' he said one evening in Lubbock."); id. at 228 ("It 
seemed to me ... the Doctor brought more than his usual competitive zeal to this case-
he brought something extra, an almost personal animus, to the crusade to get Gayland 
Bradford executed."). 
64 !d. at 218. 
65 The Thin Blue Line (1988) was made by New York Filmmaker Errol Morris, who 
originally planned to do a film on Dr. Grigson but changed his mind after investigating 
the Adams case. RosENBAUM, supra note 60, at 219. 
66 Adam's death penalty was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court because the jury 
selection process was defective. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980}, rev'g Adams v. 
State, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Grim. App. 1979). The Governor commuted Adams' death 
penalty, thereby depriving Adams of a new trial. Adams v. State, 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 
Grim. 1981). Adams eventually was granted a new trial. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 
281 (Tex. Grim. App. 1989). 
Adams recounts his ordeal in RANDALL DALE ADAMS ET AL., ADAMS V. TEXAS (1991). 
116 PAUL C. GIANNELLI [Vol. 84 
ams was subsequently released due to innocence,67 the Doctor has 
not changed his mind. According to Grigson, "Adams 'will kill 
again.' " 6 8 
Barifoot cannot be discounted as a "constitutional case" that has 
limited precedential value in interpreting evidentiary rules. Had the 
Court relied on some constitutional provision other than the Eighth 
Amendment, such an argument would have much cogency. The 
Court's "cruel and unusual punishment" jurisprudence, however, 
has repeatedly emphasized that a heightened standard of reliability 
is required when the penalty is death. According to the Court, "the 
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise 
to a special 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment' in any capital case. " 69 In addition, prose-
cutors have argued that Barifoot is not limited to constitutional 
cases. For example, federal prosecutors asserted that Barifoot, not 
Frye, was the controlling evidentiary standard in United States v. Yee, 70 
the first federal case considering the admissibility of the FBI's DNA 
procedure. 
The Bush Administration had it backwards; if there is to be a 
stringent standard of admissibility, it should be applied in criminal, 
not civil, cases. The interests involved in criminal and capital prose-
cutions require a cautious approach, although not necessarily Frye. I 
have argued elsewhere that prosecutors should be required to sat-
isfy a heavy burden before novel scientific evidence is admitted at 
trial. 71 Only the government has the resources to commission or 
6 7 After an extensive Texas habeas proceeding, in which Adams again claimed his 
innocence, the judge wrote: 
Although the court cannot determine the applicant is "innocent" of the Wood mur-
der ["Since innocence is not a basis in Texas for a new trial ... "], on the basis of the 
evidence presented at the habeas corpus hearing, applying the law which places the 
burden of proof on the State beyond a reasonable doubt, the court would have 
found applicant not guilty at a bench trial. 
Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 285 (quoting habeas record). 
68 RosENBAUM, supra note 60, at 220 (quoting Dr. Grigson). 
69 Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) 
(White, J., concurring in judgment)). 
See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) ("The finality of the death 
penalty requires 'a greater degree of reliability' when it is imposed.") (quoting Lockhart 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (Be-
cause the death penalty is different, the Court has "invalidated procedural rules that 
tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination."). 
70 134 F.R.D. 161, 188 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (magistrate's report). The magistrate ruled 
that, with regard to DNA evidence, the Frye test was the applicable standard, and that the 
DNA evidence satisfied the Frye test. 
71 Giannelli, supra note 37, at 1248 ("The prosecution in a criminal case should be 
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conduct the necessary validity studies for this type of evidence. 
If we are going to make mistakes in assessing the validity of a 
novel technique, they should be mistakes delaying the admission of 
reliable evidence and not mistakes of admitting unreliable evidence. 
Professor Berger has put the question starkly: "[W]hat error rate 
are we willing to tolerate when we might be sending someone to the 
electric chair?"72 
The Court in Barefoot justified its lax evidentiary standard, in 
part, by relying on the adversary system to "uncover, recognize, and 
take due account of [the] shortcomings" of expert testimony. 73 De-
termining whether the adversary system is up to this task requires an 
examination of a number of procedural rules, such as those gov-
erning the appointment of defense experts and pretrial discovery. 
These issues are discussed in the following sections of this article. 
III. DEFENSE EXPERTS 
The former Vice President's Task Force proposed an amend-
ment to Rule 702, which prohibits the payment of contingent fees to 
expert witnesses. The prohibition is broadly phrased. An expert is 
disqualified if any compensation, "directly or indirectly," would vary 
as a result of the outcome of the case. 74 The rule is intended to 
preclude the use of biased experts and might even extend to Dr. 
Grigson, who reportedly earned $200,000 a year from expert-wit-
ness fees ($150 an hour) and from a limited private practice .75 
This proposal, however, does not deal with problems of institu-
tional bias-the control of crime laboratories by the police. 76 
Problems in relying on police-controlled crime laboratories have 
arisen in politically sensitive cases. For example, a federal grand 
jury investigating the deaths of Black Panther leaders in a police raid 
reported that the "testimony of the firearms examiner that he could 
not have refused to sign what he believed was an inadequate and 
required to establish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable 
doubt."). 
72 Katherine Bishop, Leaps of Science Create Quandaries on Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
1990, at B6, col. 3. 
73 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-89 (1983). 
74 See supra note 26. 
75 Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 231. See also John Bloom, Doc/or For the Prosecution, 
AM. LAw., Nov. 1979, at 25 ("[L]ast year he earned more than $67,034 in fees from 
Dallas County alone, a figure that doesn't include murder cases in other Texas cities."). 
76 See Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the X a lion :S Criminalistics Labora-
tories, 30 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 10, II (1985) ("Seventy-nine percent of all [257 out of 319) 
laboratories responding to our survey are located within law enforcement/public safety 
agencies."). 
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preliminary report on pain of potential discharge is highly alarm-
ing. " 77 Similarly, the prosecution of the Maguires as IRA terrorists 
in Britain rested on evidence that was not only "scientifically false 
but also known to be by all concerned parties and scientists. " 78 As 
discussed below, the problem of biased experts, although present in 
criminal cases, is outweighed by far more serious systemic 
problems. 
A. EXPERT ASSISTANCE FOR INDIGENTS 
Those familiar with criminal prosecutions might be bemused by 
a discussion of the contingent fee issue-not because they favor 
such fees, but because obtaining the services of any defense expert 
in criminal litigation is so difficult. Obtaining expert assistance is 
generally not a problem for the prosecution, which has access to the 
services of state, county, or metropolitan crime laboratories. In ad-
dition, federal forensic laboratories often provide their services to 
state law enforcement agencies. For example, the services of the 
FBI Laboratory are available to all duly constituted state, county, 
and municipal law enforcement agencies in the United States.79 
These services, which are provided without charge, include both the 
examination of evidence and the court appearance of the expert. 
Forensic laboratory services, however, are not generally avail-
able to criminal defendants. A survey of approximately 300 crime 
laboratories revealed that "fifty-seven percent ... would only ex-
amine evidence submitted by law enforcement officials. "80 It is not 
surprising, then, that Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel in their 
1966 jury study commented: "Again, the imbalance between the 
prosecution and defense appears. In 22 percent of the cases the 
prosecution has the only expert witness, whereas in only 3 percent 
of the cases does the defense have such an advantage. " 81 Ten years 
7 7 Lowell W. Bradford, Problems of Ethics and Behavior in the Forensic Sciences, 21 J. Fo-
RENSIC Sci. 763, 767 (1976) (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ill., E. Div., Report of janumy 
1970 Grandjury 121). 
78 The Maguires were accused of possessing an explosive as part of the IRA's terror-
ism campaign. The government's case rested on the presence of nitroglycerine on the 
defendants' fingernails and gloves. Thin layer chromatography was used to detect the 
nitroglycerine: "The tests were said to be as conclusive and irrefutable as fingerprints. 
The entire underpinning for this assertion were proved not only to be scientifically false 
but also known to be by all concerned parties and scientists .... " See James E. Starrs, 
The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. FoRENSIC Sci. Soc'y Ill, 141-42 (1991) 
(citing May eta!., Interim Report on the Maguire Case, London: HMSO Uuly 12, 1990)). 
79 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SciENCE 7 (rev. ed. 
1984). 
80 Peterson eta!., supra note 76, at 13. 
8! HARRY KALVEN,jR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN jURY !39 (!966). See also Daniel 
1993 EXPERT TESTIMONY 119 
later, the issue resurfaced in the voiceprint cases. As a National 
Academy of Sciences report noted, a "striking fact about the trials 
involving voicegram evidence to date is the very large proportion in 
which the only experts testifying were those called by the state."82 
Although a number of federal and state statutes attempt to pro-
vide expert assistance, the coverage of these provisions is fre-
quently quite limited.83 Some are restricted to capital cases84 or 
drug prosecutions.85 Others impose unrealistic limitations on the 
amount that may be expended for this purpose, such as $250 or 
$300.86 Until 1986, when the ceiling was raised to $1000, the fed-
eral statute also contained a $300 maximum.87 
B. AKE V. OKLAHOMA 
In Barefoot, the Court noted that although the accused had not 
offered the testimony of an opposing expert, there was no claim that 
the trial court had "refused to provide an expert for petitioner. " 88 
Nevertheless, it was not until two years later, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 89 
that the Court for the first time recognized a due process right to 
expert assistance for indigents. Ake's attorney requested a psychiat-
ric evaluation at state expense to prepare an insanity defense. The 
trial court refused, and although insanity was the only contested is-
sue at trial, no psychiatrist testified on this issue. The Court 
reversed: 
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that 
his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at 
A. Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEO. LJ. 1276, 1278 (1966) 
(The disparity of investigative resources between the defense and prosecution "is likely 
to have its maximum impact in the presentation of evidence which must be analyzed and 
developed in the laboratory or hospital."). 
82 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTI-
FICATION 49 (1979). See also People v. Chapter, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2479 (Cal. 
Super. 1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the twenty-five [voiceprint) cases in 
which such expert testimony/opinion was admitted there was no opposing expert testi-
mony on the issue of reliability and general acceptability of the scientific community 
.... "). 
8 3 I GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, ch. 4 (discussing the constitutional 
and statutory provisions on expert assistance for indigent defendants). 
84 E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-
3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (1990). 
85 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (Baldwin 1992) (controlled substance cases). 
86 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) ($250 maximum 
in capital cases); N.Y. CouNTY LAW§ 7-22-c (McKinney 1991) ($300 maximum unless 
extraordinary circumstances shown). 
87 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e)(l) (1985). See H.R. REP. No. 417, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6165,6178. 
88 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.5 (1983). 
89 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
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trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychia-
trist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford 
one.90 
Unfortunately, many courts have interpreted Ake restrictively, 
thereby undercutting its potential as a way of lessening the disparity 
between prosecution and defense access to expert assistance. For 
example, some courts have held that "Ake does not reach noncapital 
cases. " 91 Although Ake involved a capital defendant and Chief Jus-
tice Burger, in a concurring opinion,92 attempted to impose a 
"death penalty" limitation on the right to expert assistance, there is 
nothing in the majority opinion that supports such a limitation.93 
Indeed, the Court in Little v. Streater,94 a prior civil case, had ruled 
that an indigent defendant in a paternity action had the right to a 
blood grouping test at state expense. Therefore, the "capital trial" 
limitation appears to be nothing more than a transparent attempt to 
circumvent Ake. 
Other courts limit Ake to psychiatric experts. According to the 
Alabama Supreme Court, "there is nothing contained in the Ake de-
cision to suggest that the United States Supreme Court was address-
ing anything other than psychiatrists and the insanity defense. " 95 
Consequently, the defendant's request for a forensic pathologist 
was denied. Here, again, the reach of Ake is artificially restricted.96 
90 !d. at 74. 
91 Isom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). Accord McCord v. State, 
507 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). But see Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d 
1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane) ("Nor do we draw a decisive line for due-process 
purposes between capital and noncapital cases."), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). 
92 The Chief justice wrote, "The facts of the case and the question presented confine 
the actual holding of the Court. In capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed 
warrants protection that may or may not be required in other cases." Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 
(Burger, CJ., concurring). 
93 Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, acknowledged that the majority opinion was 
not so limited. He criticized the majority because "the constitutional rule announced by 
the Court is far too broad. I would limit the rule to capital cases." Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
94 452 U.S. I (1981). 
95 Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). Accord 
Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894, 896 (Okla. 1986); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (no right to bloodstain expert) ("Such a risk [of error] in other 
areas of scientific evidence is not necessarily present because the scientific expert is 
often able to explain to the jury how a conclusion was reached, the defense counsel can 
attack that conclusion, and the jury can decide whether the conclusion had a sound ba-
sis."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986). 
96 Some courts have ruled that Ake covers nonpsychiatric experts. For example, the 
Eighth Circuit has ruled that "there is no principled way to distinguish between psychi-
atric and nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case must be not what field of 
science or expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is 
in the case, and how much help a defense expert could have given." Little v. Armon-
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While the critical role of psychiatry in insanity defense cases played 
an important part in the decision, the Court's rationale extends to 
other types of experts.97 Experts other than psychiatrists often play 
pivotal roles in criminal cases-for example, questioned document 
examiners in forgery cases.98 Indeed, the Court not only held that 
Ake had a right to expert assistance in preparing an insanity defense 
(a trial issue) but also on the issue of "future dangerousness," which 
was raised in the penalty phase as in Barefoot.99 Again, Little v. 
Streater is informative because it involved a blood test in a civil pater-
nity action. 100 Here again, an unjustifiable limitation is used to un-
dercut Ake. 
Another post-Ake issue concerns the threshold standard for de-
termining when the appointment of a defense expert is constitution-
ally required. Unlike the above issues, this one raises a legitimate 
dispute. According to Ake, the accused must make a "preliminary 
showing" that expert assistance is "likely to be a significant factor at 
trial." 101 In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 102 the Court declined 
to consider a trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics 
trout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (error to fail to appoint hypnotist), 
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). 
See also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308,314 (lOth Cir. 1992) (error to fail to appoint 
expert on battered woman syndrome); State v. Carmouche, 527 So. 2d 307 (La. 1988) 
(serologists appointed); State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989) (error to fail 
to appoint fingerprint expert). 
97 The commentary to the ABA Standards provide: 
[T]he Court's test [in Ake] for access to "basic tools of an adequate defense" has 
potentially broad application in all contexts regarding the provision of support serv-
Ices. 
The courts of a number of states have recognized a defendant's constitutional 
right to a broad range of supporting services, including such diverse issues as foren-
sic dental records, fingerprints, firearms, jury selection and demography. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALjUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-1.4 commentary 
at 23 (3d ed. 1992). 
98 As early as 1929, then-Judge Cardozo commented: "[U]pon the trial of certain 
issues, such as insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary both for the prosecution 
and for defense .... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable 
because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him." Reilly 
v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929). 
See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 97, at 22 ("The quality of representation at trial 
... may be excellent and yet unhelpful to the defendant if his defense requires assistance 
of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are available."). 
99 "[D]ue process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to 
the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing 
phase." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 (1985). 
100 In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.l (1985), the Court 
declined to consider a trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics experts 
because the defendant had not made a sufficient showing of need. The Court, however, 
gave no indication that fingerprint or ballistics experts were beyond the scope of Ake. 
101 Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. 
102 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
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experts because the defendant had "offered little more than unde-
veloped assertions that the requested assistance would be benefi-
cial." 103 Ake and Caldwell represent the extremes; the former 
involved compelling facts, while the latter involved the barest of as-
sertions.104 Thus, there is no "bright line test" for determining 
when the requisite showing has been made. 105 
Nevertheless, many courts have required defendants to shoul-
der near impossible burdens in this context. According to the Elev-
enth Circuit, a two-pronged test must be satisfied: the defendant 
must establish a reasonable probability that (1) an expert would be 
of assistance to the defense and (2) the denial of an expert would 
result in a fundamentally unfair trial. 106 The second prong erects a 
substantial barrier, certainly one that the prosecution need not sur-
mount when deciding whether to use expert testimony. To satisfy 
this burden in a case where the defense seeks to challenge a prose-
cution expert, the defense "must inform the court of the nature of 
the prosecution's case and how the requested expert would be use-
ful. At the very least, [counsel] must inform the trial court about the 
nature of the crime and the evidence linking [the accused] to the 
crime." 107 As explained below, the lack of adequate discovery often 
makes this burden impossible to meet. If the threshold standard is 
set too high, the defendant is placed in a "catch-22" situation, in 
which the standard "demand[s] that the defendant possess already 
the expertise of the witness sought." 108 
In sum, the promise of Ake remains largely unfulfilled. 109 With-
I 03 !d. at 323 n.l. 
104 Ake's only defense was insanity. His bizarre behavior at the arraignment, just four 
months after the crime, prompted the trial judge to order sua sponte a mental examina-
tion. Initially, the state psychiatrist declared Ake incompetent to stand trial, but six 
weeks later Ake was determined to be competent-provided he stayed on Thorazine, an 
antipsychotic drug. The state psychiatrist acknowledged the severity of Ake's mental 
illness and the possibility that it "might have begun many years earlier." Finally, the 
burden of producing evidence of insanity rested, under state law, with the defendant. 
Ake, 470 U.S. at 87. 
105 See Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Ake decision 
fails to establish a bright line test for determining when a defendant has demonstrated 
that sanity at the time of the offense will be a significant factor at the time of trial."). 
106 Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702,712 (lith Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 
(1987). 
107 !d. at 712. 
108 State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 657 (N.C. 1988) (error to fail to appoint finger-
print expert). 
109 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL j. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
651 (4th ed. 1992) ("Generally speaking the courts have read Ake narrowly, and have 
refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential to the de-
fense."); David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on E:xper/ Semices 
for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469 (1992); David A. Harris, Ake 
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out an effective right to defense experts, the accused often lacks the 
resources to combat junk science. Recent bite mark cases illustrate 
this point. 110 
C. BITE MARK CASES 
In Washington v. State, 111 a capital case, the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals ruled that a defendant was not entitled to the ap-
pointment of a defense expert, even though a prosecution expert 
had testified that the defendant had made the bite mark found on a 
murder victim. Moreover, the prosecution expert conceded that he 
had used a novel method of comparison that no one else had ever 
used, and he also testified that only "one in a billion people" had a 
particular characteristic shared by the defendant. 112 The basis for 
this astounding statistic is not revealed and is suspect. 
Another bite mark case, Harrison v. State, 113 involved the death 
penalty for the murder of a ten year-old girl. A prosecution expert 
testified that the defendant had bit the victim more than forty times, 
but the trial court nevertheless rejected a defense request for an ex-
pert. To demonstrate a "particularized need" for a defense expert, 
the trial judge required that the expert first review the evidence and 
write an affidavit. Without pay, however, most experts will not re-
view the evidence nor prepare an affidavit. By the time of the ap-
peal, an expert had been found, and he concluded that the "marks 
were not from bites."II 4 
Revisited: Expert Psychiatn·c Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach For the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REv. 
763,769 ( 1990) ("Lower courts often have interpreted Ake less than generously, unduly 
constricting the availability of the right."). 
110 For a discussion of bite mark evidence, see I GIANNELLI & lMWINKELRIED, supra 
note 12, ch. 13. 
Ill 836 P.2d 673 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). 
112 The prosecution's expert testified that: 
[H]e used two types of analyses to identify appellant as the assailant: 
bitemark/dentition comparison and a comparison of microorganisms found in the 
wound and in appellant's mouth. The doctor placed primary identification empha-
sis on the microorganism "aspergillus" being present in both the bitemark and in 
appellant's mouth. At trial the doctor testified that aspergillus would be found in 
the mouths of only "one in a billion people." Although the doctor claimed that his 
tests were "accepted," he admitted that he was .aware of no other persons who 
either used or advocated the use of microbiological analysis in bitemark compari-
sons. /d. at 678 (Parks, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
113 The Henry Lee Harrison case (No. 90DP1345) in now before the Mississippi 
Supreme Court. Telephone interview with john Holdridge of the Mississippi and Loui-
siana Capital Trial Assistance Project in New Orleans (Apr. 22, 1993). For a further 
discussion, see Debra Cassens Moss, Death, Habeas and Good Lawyers: Balancing Fairness 
and Finality, 78 A.B.AJ. 83, 85 (Dec. 1992). John Holdridge also noted that it is difficult 
to obtain good lawyers for three reasons: "Fees may be restricted, judges are reluctant 
to spend money on experts, and standards are lax for trial counsel." !d. at 84. 
114 /d. at 85. 
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Although bite mark comparisons are based on objective data, 
the comparison itself involves an essentially subjective judgment. 
Thus, disagreements between bite mark experts is not unex-
pected.115 Even proponents acknowledge that this type of evidence 
is "hotly contested." 116 Indeed, a surprising number of cases have 
involved disagreements where prosecution experts make a positive 
identification but defense experts testify that the mark "was not a 
bite mark at all." 117 Under these circumstances, the appointment of 
a defense expert, especially in capital cases, should be almost 
automatic. 
D. OTHER RECENT EXAMPLES 
Other sources also indicate that the lack of defense experts con-
tinues to be a problem. In 1990, the National Law journal published 
the results of a six-month investigation of the defenses of capital 
murders in the South. One of the "key findings" of this investiga-
tion concerned defense experts: "Judges routinely deny lawyers' re-
quests for expert/investigative fees." 118 Another article reports: 
1 15 People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (Ill. App. 1976), is an example. Three experts 
testified for the prosecution and four testified for the defense. The prosecution experts 
all positively identified the defendant's teeth as the source of the bite mark found on the 
murder victim. The defense experts testified either that a positive identification could 
not be made, or that Milone's teeth did not make the mark. !d. at 1356. 
Other cases in which experts disagreed include: State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 
563-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); People v. Bethune, 484 
N.Y.S.2d 577, 580-83 (App. Div. 1984); Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 750-52 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1990); State v. Howe, 386 A.2d 1125, 1132 (Vt. 1978). 
l16 Raymond D. Rawson et al., Analysis of Photographic Distortion in Bite Marks: A Report 
of the Bite Mm·k Guidelines Committee, 31 J. FoRENSIC Scr. 1261, 1261-62 (1986) ("Although 
bite mark evidence has demonstrated a high degree of acceptance, it continues to be 
hotly contested in 'battles of the experts.' Review of trial transcripts reveals that distor-
tion and the interpretation of distortion is a factor in most cases."). 
117 People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879, 886 (N.Y. 1984) (four prosecution experts and 
three defense experts testified), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985). 
Other examples include: State v. Holmes, 601 N.E.2d 985,991-93 (Ill. App. 1992) 
(two prosecution experts testified that defendant inflicted bite marks found on victim; 
two defense experts testified that marks were not bite marks and not made by defend-
ant); Davis v. State, 611 So. 2d 906, 910 (Miss. 1992) (prosecution expert had "no 
doubt" that defendant's teeth made bite mark; defense expert testified that mark on 
defendant's arm was not a bite mark, but even if it were, it was inconsistent with Davis' 
teeth); Kris Sperry & Homer R. Campbell, Jr., An Elliptical Incised Wound of the Breast 
Misinterpreted as a Bite Injury, 35 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 1226 ( 1990) (Two odontologists made a 
positive identification of bite marks in a murder trial, and then defense experts showed 
that the mark had been misinterpreted-that it was not "even" a bite mark. The jury 
acquitted.). 
118 Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defeme: Trial and Error in the 11/ation 5 Death Belt, NAT'L L.J., 
June II, 1990, at30. As part of the investigation, 60 death-row trial lawyers were inter-
viewed. "54.2% felt court provided inadequate investigation and expert funds." !d. at 
40. One attorney, who was appointed to represent a death row inmate in Georgia, had 
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"In recent DNA cases in Oklahoma and Alabama, the defense 
did not retain any experts, because the presiding judge had refused 
to authorize funds." 119 In addition, a 1992 study of indigent de-
fense systems noted that the "greatest disparities occur in the areas 
of investigators and expert witnesses, with the prosecutors possess-
ing more resources."l2o 
In sum, the problem of "contingent fee" experts seems rather 
minor when compared to a death penalty case without any expert to 
rebut the prosecution's scientific evidence. 
IV. DISCOVERY 
The junk science opponents also advocate expanded pretrial 
discovery of expert testimony as a way to ferret out bad science. 
Former Vice President Quayle asserted that: 
More comprehensive inquires should be permitted of proposed 'ex-
pert' witnesses through interrogatories and depositions .... Litigants 
should be able to scrutinize experts by obtaining more information 
about them. To this end, disclosure of additional core data should be 
required-namely, a list of the expert's publications and a description 
of the expert's compensation arrangement-without cost to the op-
posing party. 121 
At the same time that the former Vice President was trumpeting the 
virtues of expanded discovery in civil litigation, federal prosecutors 
were opposing discovery in the first major DNA case using the FBI 
procedure. In United States v. Yee, 122 the government opposed dis-
covery of matching criteria, environmental insult studies, popula-
his request for the appointment of an expert denied. He commented: ''There's an eco-
nomic presumption of guilt. ... The district attorney has all the resources of the state 
crime lab, and we have to go hat in hand to the judge and the DA on every request." !d. 
at 38. 
See also A Study of Representation in Capital Cases in Texas, 56 TEX. BJ. 333, 408 (Apr. 
1993) (Report ofThe Spangenberg Group prepared for the Texas State Bar) ("There is 
a serious underfunding of essential expert services and other expenses in capital trials 
and appeals.") 
119 Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 Sci. 
AM. 46, 53 (May 1990). 
See also Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)(no defense ex-
pert testified in first appellate case considering the admissibility of DNA evidence); 
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989) (no defense expert testified in an 
early DNA case); NAT'L REs. CouNCIL, CoMMITTEE ON DNA TECH. IN FoRENSIC SciENCE, 
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FoRENSIC SciENCE 149 ( 1992) ("Because of the potential power of 
DNA evidence, authorities must make funds available to pay for expert witnesses .... "). 
120 ROGER A. HANSON, INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE jOB DONE AND DONE WELL 100 
(1992) (study by the National Center for State Courts). 
121 Quayle, supra note 16, at 566. 
122 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990), adopted by 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
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tion data, and proficiency tests. 123 In contrast, the National 
Academy of Sciences DNA report unequivocally recommends exten-
sive discovery.124 
In addition, the former Vice President was apparently unaware 
that the information he sought disclosed in civil trials was typically 
not subject to discovery in criminal litigation. 125 Indeed, criminal 
discovery does not even match what was available under the current 
civil rule, the one Quayle found so deficient. Typically, there are no 
discovery depositions or interrogatories in criminal prosecutions, 126 
and in many jurisdictions, the defense does not have a right to a list 
of the prosecution witnesses, including experts. 127 
The most common discovery provision in criminal litigation 
concerns scientific reports. There is, however, often no require-
ment that a report be prepared, and oral reports may not be discov-
erable.128 Consequently, the defense may not learn that a 
prosecution expert will testify until that expert takes the stand at 
trial. Moreover, the typical lab report is grossly inadequate-often 
providing only a "summary of the results of an unidentified test con-
ducted by an anonymous technician." 129 For example, a report con-
taining the results of a gunshot residue test may not specify the 
methodology used-for example, neutron activation analysis, 
atomic absorption, the paraffin test, scanning electron microscopy, 
or another technique. Some of these procedures are valid, but 
123 The U.S. Magistrate eventually ruled in favor of the defense, but had to resort to a 
creative interpretation of Criminal Rule 16, the federal discovery provision, to reach this 
result. The discovery argument initially focused on whether these documents were dis-
coverable scientific reports within the meaning of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D). The 
magistrate ultimately ruled these documents were "predicate materials" under FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(C), which governs the inspection of documents and tangible objects. 
!d. at 635. 
124 "The prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to defense counsel and 
experts retained by the defendant all material that might be necessary in evaluating the 
evidence." NAT'L REs. CouNCIL, supra note 119, at 145. 
125 For a detailed discussion, see Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, 
and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REv. 791 (1991). 
126 Depositions are generally limited to the preservation of the testimony of a witness 
who will be unavailable at trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. In other words, the parties may 
depose their own witnesses but not the opposing witnesses. 
127 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
128 Under current Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, oral reports are not discoverable. See United 
States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant not entitled to discovery 
of verbal report of FBI photographic expert), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987); United 
States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 659 (lllh Cir. 1983) (police officer testified as an emer-
gency medical technician without notice to defense; Rule 16 not implicated because "no 
... reports were made in th[e] case."), cat. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984). 
129 United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1123 (5th Cir. 1989) (Williams, J., 
dissenting). 
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others are not. 130 In addition, the qualifications of the expert, the 
ultimate conclusion reached, 131 and the bases for the conclusion 
typically are not reported. Other important documents, such as 
bench notes 132 and graphs, 133 may not be subject to discovery. 
Finally, none of the typical reasons for distinguishing civil and 
criminal discovery apply in this context. 134 The ABA Standards 
note: "The need for full and fair disclosure is especially apparent 
with respect to scientific proof and the testimony of experts .... [I]t 
is virtually impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be 
distorted or misused because of its advance' disclosure." 135 
An amendment to Criminal Rule 16, currently under considera-
tion, would rectify most the problems discussed in this section. The 
amendment reads: 
(E) Expert Witnesses: At the defendant's request, the government 
shall disclose to the defendant a written summary of testimony the 
government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence during its case in chief at trial. This summary 
must describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and the reasons 
therefor, and the witnesses' qualifications. 136 
The junk science opponents played no part in the promulgation of 
this amendment. 137 Instead, the Bush administration advocated ex-
130 I GIANNELLI & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, ch. 14 (discussing the various tests, 
including defects in the paraffin test). 
13I See Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (no error where 
serologist report contained specific findings but not conclusions drawn from findings). 
See also United States v. Cole, 707 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (ruling that Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16 entitled the accused to lab report but not to a "comprehensive preview of 
the government's [expert] opinion testimony."). 
132 See United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 
chemist's bench notes concerning heroin analysis are not discoverable), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1088 (1990); United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding 
DEA chemist's work notes are not discoverable); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 
785, 791 (Va. 1989) (holding DNA expert's work notes are not discoverable), cert. denied, 
493 u.s. 1093 (1990). 
133 See Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 51 (Ga. 1983) (microspectrophotometer 
graphs used in fiber analysis not discoverable even though 13 graphs admitted at trial as 
prosecution exhibits). 
134 Opponents of liberal discovery in criminal cases argue that discovery will en-
courage perjury, will lead to the intimidation of witnesses, and because of the Fifth 
Amendment, will be a one-way street. See 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 252, at 36-37 (2d ed. 1982). 
135 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 66-67 
(Approved Draft 1970). 
136 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(E) (proposed amendment). On April 22, 1993 the 
Supreme Court approved this proposal and transmitted it to Congress. Unless Con-
gress disapproves, this provision will become effective on Dec. I, 1993. 
137 The amendment is based on a proposal made by Professor Eads. Linda Eads, 
Adjudication by Ambush: Federal Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific Experts in a System of Limited 
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pansive discovery in civil cases, and opposed discovery in the DNA 
cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The "junk science" debate and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Daubert have cast a spotlight on the problems associated with the use 
of expert testimony and scientific evidence. Unfortunately, the 
criminal side of the docket has remained in the shadows. It is time 
to shift the spotlight. 
The use of scientific evidence in criminal trials should be en-
couraged. It is often better than other types of evidence typically 
used in criminal prosecutions-for example, eyewitness testimony. 
The present adversary system, however, does not contain sufficient 
safeguards to protect against the misuse of scientific evidence. 
There is a critical need for a heightened standard which demands 
demonstration of reliability before novel scientific evidence is ad-
mitted in criminal trials. A better system for providing defense ex-
perts also must be developed. Finally, criminal discovery should be 
expanded; the proposed amendment to Federal Criminal Rule 16 is 
an important step in the right direction. 
Criminal Discovery, 67 N.C. L. REv. 577, 622 (I989). The other article cited by the advi-
sory committee was Giannelli, supra note I25. 
The problems of discovery of scientific evidence were discussed earlier in Symposium 
on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, IOI F.R.D. 599 (1983), which included Paul C. 
Giannelli, Observations on Discovery of Scientific Evidence, IO I F.R.D. 622 (1983), and James 
E. Starrs, Comments on Discovery and Its Application to the Lindbergh Kidnapping Case, I 0 I 
F.R.D. 625 (1983). 
